Innovation and Imitation at Various Stages of Development: A Model with Capital by Polterovich, Victor & Tonis, Alexander
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Innovation and Imitation at Various
Stages of Development: A Model with
Capital
Victor Polterovich and Alexander Tonis
New Economic School
2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20067/
MPRA Paper No. 20067, posted 18. January 2010 11:01 UTC
1 Introduction
A complicated picture of relative productivity growth in different countries is one of the main challenges
for the modern economic science. Advanced economies seem to be converging to each other. Another
converging group includes a number of Latin American and some other countries with 20-30% of the
USA GDP per capita. These two groups seem to be growing with equal rates whereas most of African
countries fall behind. It looks like world income is moving toward a distribution with two peaks. This
observation, made by Quah (1993), gave birth to a number of research about ”club convergence”.
In fact, some explanations of this phenomenon may be got in framework of underdevelopment
or poverty trap theories. There are four different classes of development trap models that consider
the trap as a result of a lack of physical capital, human capital, productivity, and low quality of
economic and political institutions (see Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Feyrer (2003) for a survey
and references).
Easterly, Levine (2000), and Feyrer (2003) found, however, that factor accumulation can not
explain two peaks distribution: “the output per capita is tending toward twin peaks despite the
tendency toward convergence in the accumulable factors. The productivity residual, on the other
hand, shows movement similar to the distribution of per capita output...” (Feyrer (2003), p.31). Thus
interactions between innovation and imitation processes and institutional development should play
dominant roles in modelling of the club convergence behavior.
Up to the end of eighties, innovation and imitation, two sides of the development process, were
modelled separately. Segerstrom (1991) cites the only exception: a paper by Baldwin and Childs (1969)
where firms can choose between innovating and imitating. Iwai (1984a,b) considered distributions of
firms in an industry with respect to efficiency and suggested a model that describes evolution of
the distribution curves. The model demonstrates a “dynamic equilibrium” between innovation and
imitation processes. This approach, in principle, may be implemented to country distributions as well.
It is developed in a number of papers by Henkin and Polterovich (see Polterovich, Henkin (1988) and
Henkin, Polterovich (1999) for a survey). They assume that a firm moves to the neighboring efficiency
level due to innovation and imitation of more advanced technologies, and the speed of the movement
depends on the share of more advanced firms. The movement is described by a difference-differential
equation that may be considered as an analogue of the famous Burgers partial differential equation.
It is shown that innovation-imitation forces may split an isolated industry into several groups so that
the solution looks like a combination of several isolated waves moving with different speeds.
Segerstrom (1991) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model and studies its steady state in
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which some firms devote resources to discovering new products and other firms copy them. Somewhat
similar model is suggested in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) to describe the interaction between
innovation and imitation as an engine of economic growth. They show that follower countries tend
to catch up to the leader because imitation is cheaper than innovation. Barro and Sala-I-Martin
discuss also a number of related issues and papers devoted to technological diffusion, R&D races and
leapfrogging. The theory of leapfrogging is developed in Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993).
In a recent paper by Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002), it is shown that countries at early
stages of development use imitation strategy whereas more advanced economies switch to innovation-
based policy. Relatively backward economies may switch out of investment-based strategy too soon
or fail to switch at all. In the latter case, they get into a non-convergence trap. The traps are more
likely if the domestic credit market is imperfect. The authors receive also a number of other results
that characterize policies for different stages of development.
In their paper, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti implicitly assume that all countries imitate the
most advanced technology and that there is the “advantage of backwardness”: relatively backward
countries have the same opportunities to imitate as more developed ones and experience faster techno-
logical development due to the imitation. Such an assumption does not take into account the problems
of adapting modern technologies. This problems seem to be more serious for wider technology gap.
Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2002) include this effect in their model of convergence clubs using Shum-
peterian dynamics. In their model, the Poisson arrival rate of a technological improvement negatively
depends on the country’s extent of backwardness. This dependency may cause non-convergence.
However, in that model, underdevelopment traps and different convergence clubs occur only when the
authors introduce two levels of innovation/imitation intensity, what they call “implementation” and
“modern R&D”, with the latter option accessible only for developed economies.
Our model (its first version was suggested in Polterovich, Tonis (2003)) borrows a number of
elements from Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002). We concentrate on the innovation-imitation
tradeoff and develop this part of their model.
Our approach is different from approaches used by other authors in several important aspects.
1. We do not assume, as it is done in other papers, that a country always imitates the most advanced
technology. This assumption seems to be too strict. Every developing country experiences a lot
of failures connected with attempts of borrowing the most recent achievements of the developed
world. It is too often that modern techniques and technologies turn out to be incompatible with
domestic culture, institutions, quality of human capital, or domestic technological structure.
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A rational policy admits borrowing of the past experience of the leaders. Imitation of a less
advanced technology is cheaper and has more chances for a success.
2. We make difference between global and local innovations. The first ones may be borrowed by
other countries whereas the second ones are country specific. It is quite plausible that the most
part of R&D expenditures are spent for local innovations1. If one likes to use R&D expenditures
as a measure for the innovation activity, one should not assume that all innovations produced
are useful for other countries2.
3. The larger is an innovation or an imitation, the less is the probability to produce it (in accordance
with Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2002). Therefore, both policies exhibit decreasing rate of return.
The tradeoff between innovation and imitation projects may result in producing both of them
in positive proportions.
4. Costs of imitation and innovation in a country depend on its relative level of development.
The level of development is defined as a ratio of the country productivity parameter to the
productivity of the most advanced economy. A similar assumption is used in Acemoglu, Aghion,
and Zilibotti (2002), where the costs per unit of the productivity increase are taken to be constant
for imitation and linear for innovation. We consider quite general shape of cost functions. It is
assumed, however, that the value of imitation cost function increases and the value of innovation
cost function decreases when the economy approaches a leader. A similar assumption about the
cost of imitation may be found in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995). The reason is that less
advanced economies may borrow well-known and cheap technologies that may be even obsolete
for advanced economies.
The shape of dependence of unit innovation cost on development levels is more questionable. On
the one hand, one could assume decreasing rate of return, on the other hand, accelerating effects
of the technical progress occur. We analyze empirical data to demonstrate that unit innovation
cost is probably less for most advanced economies.
5. We take into account the country’s institutional quality that affects imitation and innovation
cost functions. Since the institutional indicators are considered as exogenous, we study the
behavior of the economy for a broad class of expenditures functions.
1In Pack (2001, p.114) the following passage from Ruttan (1997) is cited: “The technologies that are capable of
becoming the most productive sources of growth are often location specific”. Pack writes that “this view is widely shared
among those who have done considerable research on the microeconomics of technology”.
2In Russia in 2001, R&D expenditures amounted to 100.5 billion rubles, whereas the value of exported technologies
was only 19 billion rubles. (Russian Statistical year book, 2002. M.: Goskomstat, pp. 521–522). There were granted
more than 16000 patents, and only 4 of those were exported.
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6. In most of investigations, steady states are studied only. However, to generate a picture that
would resemble a real set of country trajectories, one has to consider transition paths. To do
that, we are forced to simplify our model drastically. The model is quasi-static and generates
trajectories as sequences of static equilibria3. We make use of many other simplifications as well.
Many authors, who study endogenous growth models, do not consider capital accumulation (see
Aghion and Howitt, 1998, or Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995). In Polterovich, Tonis (2003) we use this
simplification as well. It was shown that in the simple model suggested, there are three types of sta-
tionary states, where only imitation, only innovation or a mixed policy prevails. It was demonstrated
how one can find the stationary states and check their stability for a broad class of imitation-innovation
cost functions.
Using World Bank and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) statistical data for the period of
1980-1999, we revealed the dependence of innovation and imitation cost on GDP per capita measured
in PPP and on indicator of investment risk. An appropriate choice of five adjustment parameters of
the model gave a possibility to generate trajectories of more than 80 countries and, for most of them,
got quantitatively correct pictures of their movement. We found that the model generates a picture
qualitatively similar to the real one. Roughly speaking, three groups of countries behave differently.
There is a tendency to converge within each group. Countries with low institutional quality have
stable underdevelopment traps near the imitation area. Increase in the quality moves the steady
state toward a better position and turns into a new stable steady state where local innovations and
imitations are jointly used. Under further institutional improvements, a combined imitation-innovation
underdevelopment trap disappears. All countries with high quality of institutions are moving toward
the area where pure innovation policy prevails.
It was mentioned above that, in accordance to empirical findings, capital accumulation does not
play a decisive role in the formation of clubs. However the conclusion is related to long run behavior
only. It is important to know to what extent the picture is changing if one takes capital into account.
Below we suggest and study a modification of our previous model, this modification describes capital
accumulation as well4. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, the choice between innovation
and imitation activities does not depend on the stock of the capital accumulated in an economy. The
choice is determined by the relative innovation and imitation costs and productivities that depend
on the relative technological level of a country and, maybe, on some exogenous parameters including
3This is a feature of the Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti’s model as well.
4An attempt to include capital to the two-sector modification of Polterovich, Tonis (2003) model was made by A.
Semenov in his MA thesis (Semenov, 2004). In this model, only pure innovation or pure imitation equilibria exist. The
model does not aim to explain the club convergence.
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institutional qualities and savings rates. Due to this fact the structure of asymptotic behavior remains
the same as in the model without capital. Thus the model explains the empirical observation. A
calibration of the model reveals, however, that the asymptotic behavior may depend on the saving
rate (it is considered as an exogenous parameter of the model). We show also that taking into account
the evolution of the capital stock improves the quality of approximation of the real data.
2 Description of the model
Consider a multi-product economy evolving over time. There are three kinds of goods in this economy:
final good, capital and the continuum set of high-technology intermediate goods indexed by ν ∈ [0, 1].
Every period, final good is competitively produced from the intermediate goods. Each intermediate
good ν is characterized by its productivity Aν . The production function for the final good is given by
Y =
1∫
0
F (Aν ,Xν)dν, (1)
where Xν is the quantity of intermediate good ν involved in the production process and F is homo-
geneous of degree 1:
F (Aν ,Xν) = Aνf(xν), xν =
Xν
Aν
. (2)
(xν is a “normalized” quantity of good ν). Here we assume that f satisfies Inada conditions and
xf ′′(x) + f ′(x) falls from ∞ to 0, as x proceeds from 0 to ∞. Through the paper, a special case of
a Cobb — Douglas production function will be considered: f(x) = xα (0 < α < 1), in which case
F (A,X) = A1−αXα.
We consider that final good can be sold in the world market at price 1. The price of intermediate
good ν is pν . The producer of final good chooses its demand for each of intermediate goods Xν , taking
all prices as given, so as to maximize its profit:
Y −
1∫
0
pνXνdν → max . (3)
Intermediate goods can be produced from capital. The production function in the intermediate
goods sector is assumed to be linear: one unit of capital can be converted to one unit of intermediate
good5. In each sector ν ∈ [0, 1], only one firm enjoys the full access to the technology of producing
5We can use one-to one production function because the unit of intermediate good ν along with the technological
parameter Aν can be properly adjusted
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the corresponding intermediate good, so the market for each intermediate good is monopolistic. Let
the rental price of capital be r. Then firm’s profit Vν is given by
Vν = (pν − r)Xν . (4)
The firm is facing the demand of the final good sector for its product and monopolistically chooses pν
so as to maximizes its profit Vν .
In each sector ν, the monopolist firm lives for one period of time6. At the beginning of the period,
all sectors starts with the same (country-specific) productivity level A. This level represents the
cumulative technological knowledge achieved by the economy up to that date. Prior to producing its
intermediate good, each firm may perform technological innovations and imitations, thus raising its
productivity from A to Aν , and then produces input with productivity Aν (it will be described later
on, how Aν is determined).
The above considerations concern the domestic economy. There are also foreign countries, in
which initial productivity levels may differ from that of the domestic country. Denote by A¯ the initial
productivity level of the most developed economy. Along with the domestic absolute productivity
level A, let us consider the relative level a =
A
A¯
which measures the distance to the world technology
frontier. It represents the position of the domestic technologies among other ones.
Now let us describe the evolution of technologies. As we said, each firm performs imitation and/or
innovation prior to production. Let b1 and b2 denote, respectively, the size of the imitation and
innovation project. Each project may result in one of two outcomes, success or failure. If the imitation
(innovation) was successful, firm’s productivity rises at growth rate b1 (b2); otherwise, it remains the
same. If both projects were successful, the productivity grows at rate b1+b2. Thus, after both actions,
the technology variable A(ν) is given by
Aν = (1+ ξ1ν)(1+ ξ2ν)A, (5)
where ξ1ν (ξ2ν) is a random variable equal to b1 (b2) in the case of successful imitation (innovation) by
firm ν and 0 otherwiseThis multiplicative probability function brings about a complementarity effect
between imitation and innovation: a progress in opportunities for imitation results in more innovation
and vice versa.
Firms cannot imitate technologies which have not been developed anywhere in the world yet, so
the size of the imitation project is subject to constraint
(1+ b1) ≤
1
a
, (6)
6Unlike the model by Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002a), in which firms live for two periods and form overlapping
generations.
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where a =
A
A¯
. The maximal productivity level A¯ is generated by the leader economy and is not affected
by innovations made by less advanced economies. Thus, we assume that the followers produce local
innovations which are country-specific and cannot be imitated. We assume that the probabilities of
success are, respectively, ψ1(b1) and ψ2(b2), where ψi(bi) is decreasing in bi, ψi(0) = 1 and biψi(bi),
the expected value of the corresponding technological growth rate, is bounded from above (i = 1, 2).
In particular, we consider the following special case of ψi(bi):
ψi(bi) =
µi
µi + bi
, (7)
where µi > 0 is a parameter. The expected productivity growth rate that the project can yield is then
µibi
µi + bi
, which cannot be higher than µi, so µi may be treated as a natural ceiling for possible growth
rates due to the corresponding activity (imitation or innovation).
Now let us introduce the costs of imitation and innovation. Technological development includes not
only invention or adoption of new methods of production, but also implementation of these methods
to the existent machinery. To adopt the costs of spreading technological knowledge over the economy,
we assume that the costs of imitation and innovation depend not only on the size of the corresponding
project bi, but also on the amount of capital to be upgraded. Specifically, in order to undertake
project bi, the firm has to invest Kqibi units of capital, where K is the average capital stock over the
economy.
The distance to the world technology frontier may also affect the growth opportunities. So, it is
supposed that q1 and q2, the per-unit costs of imitation and innovation, are not constant, they depend
on the relative average productivity level of our economy at the beginning of the period7: qi = qi(a) (qi
are continuous and differentiable in a). We assume (and this is supported by the empirical evidence)
that q1(a) is increasing and q2(a) is decreasing in a. According to this assumption, it gets more difficult
to imitate and easier to innovate, as the domestic technology gets closer to the world technology
frontier. The reasons may be the following. On the one hand, less developed countries must imitate
less advanced technology to grow by 1% and it is typical that less advanced technologies are less
protected by intellectual property laws; they are also easy to implement because of a lot of experience
accumulated by other imitators. On the other hand, the innovation process is likely to exhibit some
economy of scale due to a positive externality exerted by the stock of almost accumulated knowledge,
so more advance countries incur less costs.
Thus, both forms of technological development are modelled in a similar way here. However, the
opportunities for imitation and innovation change in different ways as a increases. In particular, when
7Generally, q1 and q2 may depend also on some other country-specific parameters. In the empirical section, we
consider qi as functions of savings rate and an indicator of institutional quality.
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a is close to 1, there is almost nothing to imitate, whereas innovation is possible and its cost is low.
Under the above assumptions, the expected profit of the firm (net of technology investment ex-
penditures) is given by
E(Πν) = E(Vν)− rZν, (8)
where Vν is given by the profit maximization in (4), the expectation is taken over the four possible
realizations of success/failure of innovation/imitation indicated by random variables ξ1ν and ξ2ν and
Zν is the amount of capital invested in innovation and imitation:
Zν = K(q1(a)b1+ q2(a)b2). (9)
In the beginning of the period, the firm chooses b1 and b2 so as to maximize its expected net profit
given by (8).
The technological parameter A changes from period to period. We assume that each sector ν
produces in the next period something slightly different from current-period output, so the current
technology cannot be directly used in the next period. Thus, technological knowledge depreciates
(gets obsolete) to some extent. In accordance with this assumption, we define the next-period initial
productivity level A+1 as follows:
A+1 = (1− ρ)A˜, (10)
where
A˜ = (1+ψ1(b1)b1)(1+ψ2(b2)b2)A (11)
is the average of the achieved productivity level Aν over the economy
8 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is the depreciation
rate (ρ = 0, if the intertemporal technology transfer is costless, i. e. next-period intermediate goods are
the same as current-period ones; ρ = 1, if, on the contrary, the current-period technology is absolutely
useless for the production in the next period). Here A+1 plays the same role for the next-period firms
as A for the current-period firms. Note that in the next period (as well as in the current one), all firms
start from the same initial productivity, so there is total spillover of technological knowledge among
sectors. The assumption about independence of industry’s future productivity level on its current
innovation/imitation efforts seems to be very restrictive (in particular, the model does not describe
the behavior of long-run investors); it is imposed only for the sake of simplicity.
To finish with the description of the model, we need to specify, how capital evolves over time and
how its price is formed. Let K and K+1 be the capital stocks at the current period and the next
8Note that despite all Aν are stochastic, their average A˜ is non-random because the set of sectors is continual.
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period, respectively. We assume that the next-period capital stock is determined by
K+1 = (1− δ)K+σY, (12)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the (physical) depreciation rate, Y is the total output of the final good and σ ∈ [0, 1]
is the (constant) saving rate. Parameter σ is assumed to be country-specific. It may depend on the
quality of institutions and investment climate in the country. We also assume that ρ < δ, i. e. physical
capital depreciates faster than technology.
The capital market is perfectly competitive. The equilibrium rental rate r is determined by the
balance equation:
1∫
0
(Xν +Zν)dν = K. (13)
A dynamic equilibrium in the model is defined as the set of variables {K,A,X, b1 , b2, r, p}t (in each
period t), such that all parties make their optimal decisions concerning X, b1 and b2, with evolution
and balance equations (10), (12), (13) holing in each period.
To summarize, the economy evolves as follows. At the beginning of the period, all leader firms start
from the same productivity level A. Firms choose the sizes of their imitation and innovation projects
which maximize their profits. Then random events are realized: success or failure of these projects
(correspondingly, random variables Aν are evaluated). Then production takes place and profits are
earned. The next-period productivity level A+1 is then determined by (10). The next-period capital
stock is determined by (12). All next-period firms start their projects from productivity level A+1.
They make their innovations and imitations, thus determining A+2, their successors’ productivity
level, and so on.
3 Analysis of the model
In this section, imitation, innovation and production strategies in each country are obtained and the
dynamics or relative growth is studied based on the model described above.
Let us start with determining the demand for intermediate good. Since the final good sector is
competitive, the final good producers’ demand for intermediate good ν is given by
pν = f
′(xν). (14)
The monopolist in sector ν chooses pair (xν , pν) subject to (14) so as to maximize its profit (4). Profit
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maximization yields the optimal quantity of intermediate good produced by the monopolist:
Xν = Aνx,
where x is a solution to
r = xf ′′(x)+ f ′(x) (15)
(due to our assumptions, this solution exists and is unique). So, xν will be the same in all sectors.
Due to (14), all prices pν will be the same too.
The corresponding expected monopolistic profit (not taking into account the costs of innova-
tion/imitation) is given by
E(Vν) = e(x)A˜ = e(x)v(b1, b2)A,
where e(x) = −x2f ′′(x), v(b1, b2) = v1(b1)v2(b2), vi(bi) = (1 + ψi(bi)bi).
Let us denote by k =
K
A
the capital stock normalized by productivity. According to (8), the
expected net profit is given by
E(Πν) = A(e(x)v(b1, b2)−r(x)k(q1(a)b1+q2(a)b2)), (16)
where r(x) = xf ′′(x) + f ′(x) (see (15)).
The firm maximizes the right-hand side of (16) subject to constraints 0 ≤ b1 ≤ b¯1(a) and b2 ≥ 0,
where b¯1(a) =
1
a
− 1 is the maximal feasible level of imitation (according to (6)). It is convenient for
representing the solution to this problem to introduce the following notations:
h(x) =
e(x)
r(x)
= −
x2f ′′(x)
f ′(x) + xf ′′(x)
; (17)
ϕi(bi) =
∂v
∂bi
= ψi(bi)+biψ
′
i(bi) (i = 1, 2). (18)
Note that due to our assumptions, h(x) is increasing in x and ϕi(bi) is decreasing in bi so that ϕi(0) = 1
and ϕi(∞) = 0. It is easy to see that in the Cobb-Douglas case (f(x) = x
α), h(x) is a linear function:
h(x) = ηx, where η =
1
α
− 1.
Using these notations, we can easily obtain the optimal innovation/imitation strategy chosen by
the firm:
Lemma 1 Suppose that for given pair (k, a), production activity x is chosen optimally by all firms in
the economy. Then the optimal b1 and b2 are determined by the following equation system:
b1 = b˜1(k, x, a) = min
(
max
(
ϕ−11
(
kq1(a)
v2(b2)h(x)
)
, 0
)
, b¯1(a)
)
;
b2 = b˜2(k, x, a) = max
(
ϕ−12
(
kq2(a)
v1(b1)h(x)
)
, 0
)
.
(19)
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Proof. Provided that the solution is interior, i. e. no constraint is binding, the first-order condi-
tions for the optimal choice of bi are the following:
vj(bj)h(x)ϕi(bi) = kqi(a) (i = 1, 2; j 6= i). (20)
Adopting all constraints, we obtain (19).
Thus, due to (19), b1 and b2 can be determined as far as k, x and a are given. In equilibrium, x
can be determined by k and a from the balance equation (13), which may be rewritten as
k = v(b1, b2)x+z(b1, b2)h(x), (21)
where
z(b1, b2) =
Z
Ah(x)
= v2(b2)b1ϕ1(b1)+v1(b1)b2ϕ2(b2) (22)
and b1 and b2 are given by (19). So, x, b1 and b2 can be represented as functions of two phase variables,
k and a: x = xˆ(k, a), bi = bˆi(k, a).
Lemma 2 In the Cobb-Douglas case (f(x) = xα), bˆ1(k, a) and bˆ2(k, a) actually depend only on a
and are independent of k. Given a, pair (bˆ1(a), bˆ2(a)) can be determined from the following equa-
tion/inequality system:
q1(a) =
(≥)
ηv2(b2)ϕ1(b1)
v(b1, b2) + ηz(b1, b2)
;
q2(a) =
(≥)
ηv1(b1)ϕ2(b2)
v(b1, b2) + ηz(b1, b2)
(23)
(inequality holds, if the corresponding bi = 0).
Proof. In the Cobb-Douglas case, equation (21) takes the form
k = (v+ ηz)x (24)
and the first-order conditions for the interior solution (20) take the form
ηvj(bj)ϕi(bi) = (v+ηz)qi(a) (i = 1, 2; j 6= i). (25)
Since v and z are functions of b1 and b2 and do not depend neither on x, nor on k, then (25) implies
that b1 and b2 depend only on a. Taking into account boundary solutions (with b1 = 0 or b2 = 0), we
obtain (23).
Lemma 2 shows that the process of technological development is independent of the stock of
accumulated capital (normalized by productivity) under Cobb-Douglas production function. So, the
impact of capital on GDP growth may reveal only during the transition period, not in the long run.
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So far, we have not taken into account that constraint (6) can be binding (this is the case, when
solution b1 of system (23) is higher than b¯1(a)). Now we are going to adopt this possibility.
Lemma 3 Suppose that f(x) = xα and consider an equilibrium, at which (6) is binding in the current
period. Then bˆ1(a) = b¯1(a) and bˆ2(a) = b¯2(a), where b¯2(a) is a solution to
1−q1(a)b¯1(a)−q2(a)b2 =
(≥)
v2(b2)q2(a)
ηϕ2(b2)
(26)
with respect to b2, where the inequality holds, if b2 = 0.
Proof. If (6) is binding, then b1 = b¯1(a). The expression for the normalized capital investment in
innovation and imitation takes the form
z˜ =
Z
Ah(x)
=
q1(a)b¯1(a)k
ηx
+v1(b¯1(a))b2ϕ2(b2). (27)
Combining (27) and (24), with z˜ standing for z, we obtain the following relationship between x and k:
x =
(1− q1(a)b¯1(a))k
v1(b¯1(a))(v2(b2) + ηb2φ2(b2))
. (28)
Hence, b2 is determined by (26).
Let us denote q˜1(a) and q˜2(a) as follows:
q˜i(a) =
ηvj(bj)ϕi(bi)
v(b1, b2) + ηz(b1, b2)
(j 6= i), (29)
if constraint (6) is binding and q˜i(a) = qi(a), otherwise (v and z are given by (22), as usual). Then b1
and b2 are in any case determined by system (23), with q˜i(a) standing for qi(a), no matter, whether
constraint (6) is binding or not. It is convenient to consider these “adjusted” per-unit cost functions
q˜i(a) instead of qi(a), because they allow to ignore constraint (6).
All the above results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that f(x) = xα. Then for a country with given country-specific exogenous
parameters, the equilibrium levels of innovation and imitation activity depend only on the pair of
adjusted per-unit costs q˜(a) = (q˜1(a), q˜2(a)) (see Figure 1 on page 19):
1. If q˜(a) ∈ D00, then the economy stagnates with no technological development;
2. If q˜(a) ∈ D+0, then there is only imitation and no innovation;
3. If q˜(a) ∈ D0+, then there is only innovation and no imitation;
4. If q˜(a) ∈ D++, then a mixed policy including innovation and imitation is used.
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As it was noted before, the multiplicative form of the probability function yields some comple-
mentarity between imitation and innovation. However, the competition in the capital market may
bring about the opposite effect. It turns out that if b1 and b2 are not very high, then the total effect
is substitutionary. Indeed, provided the interior solution (bi > 0) and the Cobb-Douglas form of the
production function, b1 can be determined from
q1 =
1
b1 +
v1(b1)
ϕ1(b1)
(
1
η
+
b2ϕ2(b2)
v2(b2)
) (30)
Suppose that q2 gets higher (by some reason) and q1 remains the same. Then, as follows from (30),
b1 rises, if
b2ϕ2(b2)
v2(b2)
is increasing in b2, which is true, if b2 is not very high. Thus, the substitutability
due to the capital balance prevails over the complementarity effect in this case.
Another corollary from the optimality conditions is that b1 is decreasing and b2 is increasing in a
(again, for not very high b1 and b2), i. e., imitation is gradually replaced by innovation, as the economy
gets more developed.
Let us study the dynamics for countries with given σ and other country-specific parameters. It
is convenient to describe the position of the system by pair of phase variables (k, a). The equation
determining the evolution of capital (12) may be rewritten in terms of (k, a) as
∆k =
σf(x)− (g + δ)k
(1− ρ)v
, (31)
where ∆k = k+1 − k is the increment in k after the period, g = (1− ρ)v − 1 is the growth rate of the
domestic productivity. The evolution of the relative productivity level a is given by
∆a = a+1−a =
(
v
v¯
− 1
)
, (32)
where v¯ =
1 + g¯
1− ρ
and g¯ is the growth rate of the world technology frontier. Here we assume that v¯ > 1,
i. e. the leader undertakes some innovation in equilibrium (the leader must develop technologies itself,
because it has nothing to imitate).
A dynamic equilibrium, at which k and a are not changing over time (i. e., ∆k = 0 and ∆a = 0)
is called stationary. An important question is whether a given stationary equilibrium is stable or not.
If it is stable, then convergence takes place within the corresponding group of countries. Otherwise,
the equilibrium marks the boundary between the attraction areas of different centers of convergence.
The following proposition yields stability conditions for stationary equilibria.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that f(x) = xα and consider a stationary equilibrium, at which (6) is not
binding. Then
1. If there is no innovation in equilibrium, then the equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
2. If there is no imitation in equilibrium, then the equilibrium is unstable.
3. If both imitation and innovation are present in the equilibrium, then its stability is determined
by the value of Γ (see formula (39) below): if Γ > 0, then the stationary equilibrium is unstable;
otherwise, it is stable.
Proof. Consider an infinitesimal change in (k, a). How will it affect the subsequent evolution?
Differentiating the balance equation (21) yields
dk = (v+zh′(x))dx+x dv+h(x)dz, (33)
where dv and dz are given by
dv =
βh′(x)dx+ γk da
h(x)
−
βdk
k
, (34)
dz =
β˜h′(x)dx+ γ˜k da
h(x)
−
β˜dk
k
(35)
and β, γ, β˜ and γ˜ are defined as follows:
β = −
ϕ1(b1)
2v2(b2)
ϕ′1(b1)
−
ϕ2(b2)
2v1(b1)
ϕ′2(b2)
;
γ =
ϕ1(b1)q
′
1(a)
ϕ′1(b1)
+
ϕ2(b2)q
′
2(a)
ϕ′2(b2)
;
β˜ = −
(χ1(b1)v2(b2) + b2ϕ1(b1)ϕ2(b2))ϕ1(b1)
ϕ′1(b1)
−
(χ2(b2)v1(b1) + b1ϕ1(b1)ϕ2(b2))ϕ2(b2)
ϕ′2(b2)
;
γ˜ = −
(χ1(b1)v2(b2) + b2ϕ1(b1)ϕ2(b2))q
′
1(a)
ϕ′1(b1)v2(b2)
−
(χ2(b2)v1(b1) + b1ϕ1(b1)ϕ2(b2))q
′
2(a)
ϕ′2(b2)v1(b1)
.
(36)
Note that β is always positive, whereas γ, β˜ and γ˜ may be negative or positive, depending on the
behavior of the cost functions q1 and q2.
Combining (33)–(35), one can solve for dx as a linear function of dk and da. In particular, in the
Cobb-Douglas case the formulas for dx and dv take the following simple form:
dx =
x
k
dk−
γ
η
− γ˜
v +
β
α
da; (37)
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dv =
Γ(
v +
β
α
)
x
da, (38)
where
Γ =
v
η
γ+β(γ−γ˜) =
(
vϕ1(b1)
ηϕ′1(b1)
− βb1
)
q′1(a)+
(
vϕ2(b2)
ηϕ′2(b2)
− βb2
)
q′2(a). (39)
As follows from (38) and (39), v positively depends on a, if Γ > 0, i. e. if the cost of innovation falls
relatively faster than the cost of imitation rises, as a increases. This is a sign of divergence: different
countries may eventually grow at different rates, moving away from each other and from the leader
too. In the opposite case, convergence will take place. If the sign of Γ is positive for some a and
negative for other, i. e. v is not monotone in a, then the club convergence may take place, with clubs
forming around the steady states at which Γ < 0.
In order to analyze qualitatively the dynamics of the system, let us consider the neighborhood of
some (interior) stationary equilibrium (k∗, a∗). Suppose that the phase point (k, a) lies somewhere
near (k∗, a∗) and ∆a = 0 at this point (as well as at (k∗, a∗), by definition). Is then ∆k negative
or positive? Using (34)–(31), one can obtain in the Cobb-Douglas case the following relationships
between the increment in ∆k, x ,a and v:
d(∆k) = −
(1− α)σxα
(1− ρ)k
dk+c da, (40)
where c is some expression, not depending on any differentials. Due to (40), d(∆k) is decreasing in dx,
as far as a = const (or, equivalently, v = const). Hence, the stability of an interior steady state is fully
determined by the sign of Γ: if Γ > 0, then the stationary point is unstable and the system exhibits
saddle dynamics around it. Otherwise, the phase curves form a stable knot with faster convergence
by k and slower by a.
All the above considerations are valid for the case of interior solution, where bi > 0 and b1 < b¯1(a).
If b1 = 0, then all the above formulas can be applied if we put q
′
1(a) = 0 everywhere. In particular, Γ
is definitely positive in this case, so all countries diverge from each other within the no-imitation area.
The case b2 = 0 can be treated analogously. Γ is definitely negative in this case, so there is a room
for convergence within the no-innovation area (it is possible that the level of imitation activity will
be too low, so all these countries will grow slower than the leader and their a will eventually converge
to 0). Obviously, the case b1 = 0, b2 = 0 is impossible in a stationary equilibrium, as far as we assume
that the leader makes some innovation.
Proposition 2 gives a criterion of stability for the case, where the country does not imitate the
highest possible technology in the stationary equilibrium. However, there is also, at least, one sta-
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tionary equilibrium out of this class, namely, that of the technological leader9. Is it possible for a
successor to catch up the leader, if both countries are identical in their ability to accumulate capital
and improve technologies? The following proposition tries to answer this question.
Proposition 3 Suppose that f(x) = xα. Then a stationary equilibrium with a = 1 is stable, if the
close successors of the leader imitate its technology (q1(1) is not very high) and q
′
2(1) is sufficiently
small (see inequality (??) below). Otherwise, the stationary equilibrium is unstable, i. e. the successors
cannot catch up with the leader.
Proof. If b1 = 0 for a close to 1, then the economy has got into the no-imitation area, and due
to Proposition 2, cannot converge to the stationary equilibrium a = 1. Otherwise, the most advanced
technology will be imitated for sufficiently high a. In this case, the innovation activity is determined
by (26). Differentiating (26) at a = 1, we obtain
dv =


ηϕ2(b2)
(
q1(1)−
q′2(1)
q2(1)
)
q2(1)
(
1
α
−
ϕ′2(b2)v2(b2)
ϕ2(b2)
2
) − v2(b2)

 da, (41)
where b2 = bˆ2(1). The equilibrium a = 1 is stable, if dv < 0, i. e. if q
′
2(1) is sufficiently low. Otherwise
divergence takes place.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the structure of stable and unstable stationary equilibria is gen-
erally the same as in the model without capital (see Polterovich, Tonis, 2003). Note, however, that
in the model with capital, the possibility of convergence depends not only on the innovation cost
function q2(·), but also on the cost of imitation q1(1): higher cost implies that some capital is diverted
from innovation to imitation (near the leader, the imitation activity (if any) is independent of q1, so
the imitation expenditures are increasing in q1), which results in less active innovation. Thus, increase
in q1(1) negatively affects convergence (the right-hand side of (41) is increasing in q1(1)). There was
no such effect in the model without capital.
Note also that Proposition 3 gives a criterion of convergence only for countries, whose country-
specific exogenous parameters are identical to those of the leader. Otherwise, the point of possible
convergence is not at a = 1, but somewhere else. For example, if the costs of innovation or imitation
negatively depend on the quality of institutions, then a country, which has better institutions than the
leader, is able not only to catch up, but to overtake it. On the contrary, if the quality of institutions
9This is really a stationary equilibrium, only if no leapfrogging takes place, i. e. when no other country occupies the
leader’s position. We do not consider the possibility of leapfrogging in this model, because this is not the case in reality
so far, at least, in the period for which we have the data to calibrate the model.
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Figure 1: Cost curve q˜ (a), steady-state curve and stationary equilibria.
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for the given country is worse than for the leader, then a full catching-up is impossible, some gap will
always be present. Similar effects take place for savings rate σ, if we assume that higher σ implies
lower costs. Generally, a change in the savings rate or in the quality of institutions may affect the
position or even structure of stationary equilibria. For example, if a country is within the area of
attraction of a stationary equilibrium with low a, but close to the boundary of this area, then a short-
run increase in capital accumulation may get it out of the trap. However, the investment-encouraging
policy should be applied as soon as possible: after some wasted time, the economy will shift away
from the boundary and leaving the trap will be much more difficult.
The analysis of the dynamics can be illustrated graphically as follows. Let us define the cost curve
within plain (q1, q2) as the set of pairs (q˜1(a), q2(a)) for a ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that q2(1) = is given and
define the steady-state curve as the set of potential steady-state pairs (q1, q2), i. e. pairs for which
a+1(a) = a, where a = q˜
−1
1 (q1) (due to Propositions 2) and 3, this definition is correct). The position
of this curve depends only on q¯2 and does not depend on the position of the rest of the cost curve.
Now, to qualitatively analyze the dynamics, one just need to know, how the cost curve is positioned
about the steady-state curve (see Figure 1a,b). The relative productivity level of the economy rises
after the period if and only if point q(a) lies below and/or to the left from the steady-state curve (let
us call the corresponding zone “catching-up area”). Stationary equilibria correspond to intersection
points of the cost curve with the steady-state curve. If the cost curve gets out of the catching-up area,
as q1 goes up (in other words, the slope of the cost curve is flatter that the slope of the steady-state
curve), then the corresponding stationary equilibrium is stable; otherwise, it is unstable. For example,
in Figure 1a, there is one stable steady state with a < 1 and one unstable10, with a = 1. In Figure 1b,
there are two stationary equilibria, with a = 1 and with low a; there is also an unstable one with
intermediate a which serves as a boundary between the zones of attraction of the stable equilibria.
4 Empirical adjustment of the model
In this section, some empirical considerations will be given about the model considered above. We are
going to test some of basic assumptions of the model (in particular, those concerning the per-unit cost
functions of innovation and imitation) and to adjust the parameters of the model to the statistical
data.
10The number of stationary points in dynamic systems is usually odd. Here the number is even because one of the
points lies at the boundary of the phase space, which is [0, 1]. This equilibrium may be treated as two coincident
stationary equilibria, one stable and one unstable.
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We use data from two sources: the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2001-2003) and the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2001)11. The data structure is the following:
Yt − GDP per capita, PPP (constant 1995 international $) in year 1900 + t,
t = 80, . . . , 99, 129 countries; source: WDI;
Nt − population in year 1900 + t,
t = 80, . . . , 99, 192 countries; source: WDI;
IGt − gross capital formation, % of GDP1900 + t,
t = 80, . . . , 99, 180 countries; source: WDI;
INt − net capital formation, % of GDP1900 + t,
t = 80, . . . , 99, 136 countries; source: WDI;
R − quality of institutions (0.01× ICRG composite risk index),
average over 1984–1999, 129 countries; source: ICRG;
R ∈ [0, 1], R is higher for lower risks;
C1 − net royalty payments, % of GDP,
average over 1980–1999, 120 countries; source: WDI;
C2 − spending on R&D, % of GDP,
average over 1980–1999, 89 countries; source: WDI.
Using the above data, we are going to calibrate the theoretical model, i. e. estimate its parameters
so as to obtain good quality of prediction (in some sense). We consider a special case of the model
with Cobb-Douglas production function in the final good sector (f(x) = xα) and probability functions
ψi(bi) =
µi
µi + bi
. We assume also that per-unit cost functions of innovation and imitation q1 and q2
depend on country-specific parameters σ and R. After having considered various specifications, we
have chosen the linear representation for the cost functions:
qi = qi(a, σ,R) = caia+cσiσ+cRiR+ci. (42)
So, we are interesting in estimating the following parameters:
α − parameter of the production function;
µ1 − maximal growth rate due to imitation;
µ2 − maximal growth rate due to innovation;
δ − capital depreciation rate;
ρ − technology obsolescense rate;
11We tried more extended specifications using Barro-Lee data on human capital, POLITY data on the quality of
democracy and other ICRG risk indices. All these variables turned out to be insignificant in regressions.
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T − duration of a time period (years);
m − ratio of total imitation expenditures to royalty fees (see below);
cai, cσi, cRi, ci − parameters of linear cost functions q1(a, σ,R), q2(a, σ,R).
In order to estimate the parameters of the cost functions, we need proxies for b1 and b2. These
variables are closely related to the growth rate due to innovation or imitation, so firstly we need to
extract the growth rate of the “total factor productivity” from the GDP growth rate. The average
per-period growth rate g of real per-capita GDP is given by
g =
(
Y99
Y80
)T/19
− 1.
Due to our assumption about the Cobb-Douglas form of the production function, GDP can be repre-
sented as follows:
Y = A1−αXα, (43)
where X is the amount of capital used in production and A is the productivity factor. Denote by gX
the per-period growth rate of X. According to the model, X is proportional to total capital stock K, so
the growth rate of capital could be a good proxy for gX . We have not found systematic cross-country
data on capital stock or its growth rate (lack of such data can be explained by problems concerning
aggregation of investment for different periods of time), so we use instead the following proxy for gX :
1+gX =
1 +
IN/100
(Kt/(NtYt))av
1 + gN
, (44)
where IN is the average net investment rate INt , gN is the average per-period population growth
rate and (Kt/(NtYt))av is the average capital-to-GDP ratio (all averages are taken during the period
t = 80, . . . , 99). The values of Kt in this ratio are calculated by the usual recurrent formula
12
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt+σNtYt, (45)
where δ is to be estimated (see below) and σ is the average of IGt /100 and may be considered as a
proxy for savings rate in Solow model. In order to obtain established values of Kt, we start calculating
Kt from t = 60 (the initial value of capital stock K60 is chosen proportionally to N60Y60). Correction
by the population growth rate in (44) is needed to take into account not only capital, but also labor
in the estimation of the total factor productivity growth rate13.
12Such technique known as “perpetual inventory estimation” is also used in a number of papers on growth accounting
(e. g., see Bosworth and Collins, 2003 or Senhadji, 2000). The value of δ used in calculations is typically 0.04–0.05.
13Generally, human capital should also be taken into consideration.
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To extract the total factor productivity, we use the following regression:
ln(1+g) = α ln(1+gX )+ const. (46)
From (46) we obtain the estimated value of α (it is about 0.3, higher or lower, depending on the
depreciation rate δ). Now the estimation of the productivity factor At is determined by
At =
(
NtYt
Kαt
) 1
1−α
(it can be seen from the data that the expenditures on imitation and innovation constitute a small
part of GDP, typically, less than 2%, so, solving (43), we put X = K for simplicity).
Based on At, we construct some other country-specific variables useful for our analysis:
at =
At
At[USA]
− relative productivity level;
a − average over all at, t = 80, . . . , 99;
v =
(
A99
A80
) T
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(1− ρ)T
− proxy for productivity growth factor v in the model.
Now we are going to estimate q1 and q2, using the data on innovation and imitation activity. The
main difficulty in our analysis is that we do not know the values of q1 and q2 and observe C1 and C2
instead. Another problem is that C1, the share of net royalty payments in GDP does not include any
costs of absorbing technologies other than royalties. Hence, C1 is actually only a fraction of the total
cost of imitation. To take this into account, let us use mC1 instead of C1 as a proxy for the imitation
cost in our calculations. Here m ≥ 1 is a constant to be estimated.
We need to construct some proxies for q1 and q2. Suppose that both C1 and C2 are present in the
observation for the country and m is given. Let us denote
ζ =
mC1
C2
.
Due to (20), we have the system of two equations with two unknown variables b1 and b2:
(1 + b1ψ1(b1))(1 + b2ψ2(b2)) = v;
b1ϕ1(b1)(1 + b2ψ2(b2))
b2ϕ2(b2)(1 + b1ψ1(b1))
= ζ,
(47)
where ψi(bi) =
µi
µi + bi
and ϕi(bi) =
(
µi
µi + bi
)2
. System (47) may have multiple solutions, because
the same level of expenditures may correspond to low or high level of innovation/imitation activity.
However, if we require that more activity result in higher expenditures, then only one solution remains
(actually, the lower one).
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As far as b1 and b2 are calculated, q1 and q2 can be obtained from the first-order conditions (25).
Our next task is to estimate q1 and q2 as functions of phase variable a and exogenous
14 variables
σ (savings rate) and R (quality of institutions), taking parameters µ1, µ2, δ, ρ, T and m as given. For
a given setting of the parameters, coefficients cai, cσi, cRi and ci, determining linear functions (42),
can be estimated, using OLS. Thus, we have proxies for all parameters of the model.
It turns out that R is strongly positively correlated with a and (to a less extent) with σ. To
avoid improper estimation results, which may occur because of multi-collinearity, we construct a new
variable R˜:
R˜ = R− daa−σ, (48)
where da and dσ are the parameters of the linear regression R = R(a, σ). Thus, R˜ can be treated as a
measure of deviation of the institutional quality from some “standard” level (for the given a and σ).
This R˜ will be used instead of R in our estimation of the cost functions15.
Now, given parameters µ1, µ2, δ, ρ, T andm and estimated linear cost functions q1(a, σ, R˜), q2(a, σ, R˜),
we can study the evolution of the model world and compare it to that of the real world. We have a
sample of 83 countries, for which all necessary data are present. Each country starts from the known
pair (k80, a80). First-order conditions (19) along with balance equation (24) determine innovation-
imitation policy (b1, b2) = (bˆ1(a, σ, R˜), b2(a, σ, R˜)) (these are the predicted values of the imitation
and innovation growth rates; they do not coincide with the proxies for b1 and b2). Now we just use
formulas (31) and (32) to obtain k+1 and a+1 as functions of k and a. In particular, a+1 is determined
as follows:
a+1(a, σ, R˜) =
(1 + bˆ1(a, σ, R˜)ψ1(bˆ1(a, σ, R˜)) + bˆ2(a, σ, R˜)ψ2(bˆ2(a, σ, R˜)))
1 + bˆ2(1, σ[USA], R˜[USA])ψ2(bˆ2(1, σ[USA], R˜[USA]))
a. (49)
In order to check, whether the model is consistent with the reality, let us try to predict the relative
productivity level of countries in 1999, given that in 1980:
aˆ99 = a+1(a+1(. . . a+1(a80, σ, R˜) . . . , σ, R˜), σ, R˜) (19/T times).
In a similar way we can build a prediction for k99. Now the predicted relative GDP level yˆ99 can be
calculated as follows:
yˆ99 =
Y99
Y99[USA]
= a99
y˜99
y˜99[USA]
,
14Although, these variables are endogenous to some extent: in particular, there is evidence that institutional quality
may depend on the level of economic development.
15This approach may also partially solve the problem of endogenous institutional quality, provided that the relative
level of development mostly affects the trend rather than the deviation of R.
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where y˜t = vt
(
kt
vt + ηzt
)α
.
Now we can choose µ1, µ2, δ, ρ, T and m so as to achieve the best prediction. There are many
possible ways to measure the quality of prediction. Let us consider the following criteria:
Minimal sum of squares: the sum of squares of logarithmic errors
∑
(ln yˆ99− ln y99)
2
is minimized, where y99 and yˆ99 are, respectively, actual and predicted relative GDP values.
The objective function is unimodal, so it is easy to find its minimum. However, this criterion is
sensitive to outliers.
Coincidence of directions: the predicted direction of change in y during the period 1980–1999 must
coincide with the actual one for as many countries as possible. This criterion does not take into
account the speed of changes. It is more robust to outliers than the previous one. However, it is
algorithmically difficult to solve the optimization problem because the objective function turns
out to be multi-modal, so one cannot be sure that the obtained local optimum is also global.
Coincidence of distributions: parameters are chosen so that the density function of distribution
of ln aˆ99 be close to that of ln a99 (according to the least squares criterion). This criterion is
useful for dealing with distribution densities rather than detailed cross-country data. Since the
estimated density functions are defined within a discrete domain and have a discrete set of
possible values, the problem of multi-modality is also present for this criterion.
According to theses criteria, the best-predictive values of the parameters are the following:
Minimal sum of squares:
α = 0.285, η = 2.509;
µ1 = 0.964 (23.5% per year);
µ2 = 1.574 (34.3% per year);
δ = 0.153 (5.04% per year);
ρ = 0.367 (13.3% per year);
T = 3.20 years;
m = 3.05.
Estimated cost functions:
q1(a, σ, R˜) = 0.477
(2.57)
a− 2.750
(−2.36)
σ − 1.941
(−1.66)
R˜+ 1.314
(4.98)
(R2 = 0.241);
q2(a) = − 0.483
(−2.31)
a+ 1.003
(10.8)
(R2 = 0.106).
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Standard error of prediction of ln y: 0.227;
Percentage of incorrectly predicted directions: 16.1%;
Standard error of prediction of density: 0.0450.
Coincidence of directions:
α = 0.295, η = 2.391;
µ1 = 0.596 (18.9% per year);
µ2 = 0.827 (25.0% per year);
δ = 0.122 (4.71% per year);
ρ = 0.243 (9.80% per year);
T = 2.70 years;
m = 3.14.
Estimated cost functions:
q1(a, σ, R˜) = 0.483
(2.44)
a− 3.097
(−2.50)
σ − 2.156
(−1.74)
R˜+ 1.553
(5.56)
(R2 = 0.245);
q2(a) = − 0.499
(−2.41)
a+ 1.108
(12.1)
(R2 = 0.199).
Standard error of prediction of ln y: 0.251;
Percentage of incorrectly predicted directions: 9.7%;
Standard error of prediction of density: 0.0807.
Coincidence of distributions:
α = 0.280, η = 2.567;
µ1 = 0.395 (19.1% per year);
µ2 = 0.589 (27.6% per year);
δ = 0.096 (5.20% per year);
ρ = 0.215 (11.96% per year);
T = 1.90 years;
m = 2.80.
Estimated cost functions:
q1(a, σ, R˜) = 0.573
(2.57)
a− 3.711
(−2.65)
σ − 2.220
(−1.58)
R˜+ 1.699
(5.36)
(R2 = 0.389);
q2(a) = − 0.620
(−2.38)
a+ 1.178
(10.2)
(R2 = 0.112).
Standard error of prediction of ln y: 0.228;
Percentage of incorrectly predicted directions: 16.1%;
Standard error of prediction of density: 0.0243.
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Here t-statistics are given below the coefficients, in parentheses. Variables σ and R˜ are not included
in the estimation of the innovation cost function q2, because they are insignificant in the corresponding
regressions.
Thus, our hypotheses about the cost functions q1 and q2 are proved empirically: q1 is increasing
in a and q2 is decreasing in a with high level of significance. Note also that the savings rate and the
institutional quality negatively affect the cost function of imitation (with 7–10% level of significance)
and do not significantly affect the cost function of innovation. One of possible explanations of this
phenomenon is that the data we use mostly concern the expenditures on local innovations. Only a small
part of these R&D expenditures is immediately materialized in large investment projects involving
foreign capital, so this activity does not necessarily require good institutions. On the contrary, the
process of imitation usually requires the interaction with foreign investors, which is sensitive to the
institutional climate.
Alternatively, one could consider a model without capital, when the resource needed for production
of intermediate goods and investment in technology can be bought by fixed price 1 (as in Polterovich,
Tonis, 2003). If regressions for q1 include only a and R (as before, q2 significantly depends on a only),
then we obtain the following results (each one is best with respect to the corresponding criterion):
Standard error of prediction of ln y: 0.300 (comparing to 0.227 in the model with capital);
Percentage of incorrectly predicted directions: 22.6% (comparing to 9.7%);
Standard error of prediction of density: 0.0837 (comparing to 0.0243).
If savings rate σ is included in the regression for q1, then the quality of prediction is characterized
as follows:
Standard error of prediction of ln y: 0.284;
Percentage of incorrectly predicted directions: 22.6%;
Standard error of prediction of density: 0.0617.
Thus, taking into account investment decisions and capital accumulation improves the quality of
approximation.
The evolution of the distribution of ln y is depicted in Figure 2. One can see that both in 1980
and in 1999, the distribution density has two local peaks, and during the period, the gap between the
peaks gets deeper and wider. The right peak (ln y ≈ −0.4) consists of a group of intensively growing
countries with relatively high quality of institutions (Norway, Ireland, Finland) or high investment rate
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Figure 2: Distribution of countries with respect to ln y
Figure 3: Model without capital fails to predict the right peak.
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Figure 4: Cost curves for various savings rates and institutional levels.
(Hong Kong) or both (Japan, Singapore). These countries have a real opportunity to approach the
leader (USA). However, within the same peak, there are some other countries with weaker institutions
and decreasing a: Belgium, Austria, France, Italy. They are gradually moving away from the frontier.
The left peak is getting distributed around a wide range, rather in the left part of the picture and
consists mostly of countries moving backward. It is likely that these countries develop at a steadily
lower growth rate than the leaders and their y is converging to zero. The above theoretical analysis
suggests that these peaks may correspond to stable fixed points of a+1(a, σ, R˜) for the most typical
levels of σ and R˜.
Figure 3 depicts the actual and predicted distribution density for the model without capital (savings
rate σ is included in the regression for q1). One can see that this model does not predict the formation
of the right peak. Comparing Figure 2 with Figure3 shows the extent to which taking into account
capital accumulation improves the quality of prediction.
Figure 4 depicts typical cases of positioning the estimated cost curve with respect to the steady-
state curve. If the savings rate and the quality of institutions are low (Haiti), then all of the cost curve
lies above the steady-state curve, so the country will gradually fall to the lowest possible productivity
level (a = 0), no matter where it has started. In this case, a = 0 is a unique stable stationary
equilibrium. The corresponding point (q˜1, q˜2) lies relatively close to the pure imitation area D+0.
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There is also an unstable equilibrium a = 1.
For intermediate σ and/or R˜, the equilibrium a = 1 becomes stable and a new unstable equilibrium
with a < 1 occurs. Countries with high a (Norway) approach the leader (USA), whereas countries
with low a (Brazil, Ecuador, France, Israel, Zimbabwe) move away from the leader, towards the trap
equilibrium a = 0. One can see from Figure 4 that a follower country with the same country-specific
parameters as USA is able to catch up with the leader, only if it has started from very high a.
For even higher σ and R˜ (Indonesia), zero equilibrium becomes unstable and a new stable stationary
equilibrium with positive a occurs. There are also tho stationary equilibria: a = 1 (stable) and a < 1
(unstable). One can see that Indonesia is near the lower stable equilibrium and its position remains
almost unchanged from 1980 to 1999.
Finally, countries with the highest high σ and R˜ (Botswana, China, Singapore) have all of their cost
curve lying within the catching-up area, so these countries are intensively growing and are expected
to catch up with the leader eventually, no matter where they have started from.
5 Conclusion
The results described above support empirical findings that the convergence problem, a central problem
of the economic growth theory, may be better understood in the framework of imitation-innovation
models, and that quality of institutions has to be taken into account. We show how and why the capital
stock accumulation may not influence qualitatively the asymptotic club behavior. Our calibration
results make it plausible, however, that savings rates may have impact on asymptotics, and this
question merits to be studied in greater detail.
Empirical studies seem to show that imitations and innovations are rather complementary than
substitutable (see Polterovich and Popov (2003, Stages of Development and Economic Growth.
Manuscript)). This was the case in the model without capital. However, in the new version of
the model, this fact takes no place. Another important divergence with the reality: the most in-
tensive innovators, including USA, imitate a lot. Thus, one has to take into account that a part of
followers’ innovations is not local and may be borrowed. This part increases when the country level
of development gets higher.
It is quite plausible that the cost of imitation depends not only on the distance to frontier but also
on the position of a follower among other countries. This line of generalization leads us to a class of
models that were started to study by Henkin and Polterovich (1999).
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We treat the institutional quality as exogenously given. It is well known, however, that the
dependence is two-sided (Chong, Calderon (2000)). Taking this into account may change the structure
of the asymptotic behavior so that several mixed (imitation plus innovation) equilibria arise.
There is no doubt now that high inequality supported by the club convergence is harmful for
worldwide growth. One could ask how the total world wealth might be redistributed to increase
growth rates and consumption levels of all countries. This is an important topic for future research.
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